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Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information

Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of
Widely Available Genetic Information
Abstract - Advances in genetic research promise to loosen the tradeoff between progressivity and efficiency by allowing tax liability (or
transfer eligibility) to be based in part on immutable characteristics
of individuals (“tags”) that are correlated with their expected lot in
life. Use of genetic tags would reduce reliance on tax bases (such as
income) that are subject to individual choices and, therefore, subject
to inefficient distortion to those choices. If genetic information can
be used by private employers and insurers, the case for basing tax
in part on it becomes more compelling, as genetic inequalities would
be exacerbated by market forces.
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he other essays in this volume make clear that the future
of taxation depends importantly on innovations in the
gathering and processing of information. As the so–called
information economy continues to evolve, systems of
taxation, which obviously require detailed and accurate
information in order to function, will have to adapt as
well.1 In parallel with these innovations in the processing
of traditional tax–related information, there have also been
stunning technological developments in the identification
of new information about individual human characteristics
that may also have profound implications for taxation. We
are speaking about the human genome and the vast amount
of information that is now or soon will be available merely
from a sample of a person’s genetic material. Recent advances
in genetic research have captured the public’s imagination and promise to revolutionize our approach to treating
human disease.2 The question we wish to pursue, however,
is how such advances in genetic research might bear on tax
policy.

1

2

See Slemrod (2006) for a discussion of the implications for tax policy of
innovations in information technology.
Every few weeks a news story appears, reporting that scientists have discovered, or confirmed, the link between some illness and a particular gene, from
Huntington’s disease (which has long been known to be a hereditary disease)
to cancer, heart disease, schizophrenia, and, most recently, diabetes and Alzheimer’s. For example, see Langreth and Herper (2007) and Wade (2007a,
2007b). According to the GeneTests Web site (www.geneclinics.org), funded by
the National Institutes of Health, as of June 4, 2008 there were 1,558 diseases for
which tests are available, 1,272 of which are clinical and 286 for research only.
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weight losses associated with alternative
taxes such as those based on income or
consumption. In addition, an endowment
tax—unlike some other lump–sum taxes,
such as a head tax—would allow the tax
burden to be distributed in a manner
that many would consider distributionally fair.4 Under an endowment tax, the
greater is a person’s innate endowment to
command and enjoy economic resources,
the greater her tax burden would be. And
the less her endowment is, the less her tax
burden would be.5
Everyone agrees, however, that a primary
difficulty with an endowment tax—and a
difficulty that many commentators regard
as insurmountable—is its impracticality.
How could the taxing authority ever reliably determine an individual’s innate ability
to produce and enjoy income? What sort
of test would the government use to determine a person’s innate lifetime earning
potential?6 This is where genetic technology
enters, or may someday enter, the picture.
The rapid technological progress in the
understanding of the human genome may
eventually provide a reliable way to estimate the value of something that approximates an individual’s endowment—using
the person’s genetic information. That is,
insofar as there are human genetic markers
that are statistically correlated with lifetime
income or other measures of well–being,
such markers might be used in a tax–and–
transfer regime. One form a genetic endowment tax might take would be as a separate,

To explore that question, we consider
how progress in genetics—specifically,
the proliferation of knowledge about the
human genome—may influence the feasibility and desirability of a tax that is based
on individual human endowments, or, to
use the economist’s preferred term, a tax
based on ability. The terms “endowment”
or “ability” in this context refer to a measure of an individual taxpayer’s innate
lifetime earning capacity or the taxpayer’s
potential wage rate—an approximation
of the income that an individual could
generate during her lifetime if she chose
to pursue her highest valued use, as that
use is defined by the market. (Below we
will explain why “endowment” may
be a more descriptive term for what we
have in mind than the term “ability”;
however, consistent with the literature
in this area, we will use the terms largely
interchangeably.)
According to tax policy commentators,
the benefit of basing tax liability on individual endowment rather than on, say,
income or consumption would be a reduction in the efficiency cost of raising tax revenue for any given level of distributional
consequences. The efficiency benefit of an
endowment tax3 would be the same as that
of any lump–sum tax: because the endowment tax targets innate characteristics of
individuals and, thus, would not depend
on individual choices, the tax would avoid
labor/leisure—and any other—distortions and, hence, would avoid the dead3

4

5

6

Although we generally refer to an endowment “tax,” we mean this to include net transfers, so the reader
should be thinking of a tax–and–transfer system that depends in part on an indicator of genetic endowment.
This aspect of an endowment tax is shared by differential head taxes, such as those used in the Middle Ages
when there was a fixed tax levy that varied only by one’s station in life: peasant, noble, etc.
Because we are applying a welfarist framework in this paper, when we use the term “distributionally fair” or “distributional equity,” we mean a distribution of resources that is consistent with maximizing overall social welfare.
As we explain more fully below, the welfarist case for redistributive transfers generally assumes the diminishing
marginal utility of income for all individuals and, more generally, that individuals’ utility functions are homogeneous.
For example, one might consider how to implement an ability tax based on an aptitude test as a rough measure
of a child’s innate intelligence. One problem with such a test is the difficulty of selecting an appropriate testing
age, when the child would be old enough to produce meaningful predictions of his/her income–earning ability
but young enough to be immune to his/her parents’ possible efforts at manipulation of the system (such as
by urging the child, unlike with other tests, to pick the “wrong” answers.) Basing the tax on a test like the SAT
would exacerbate the manipulability problem and raises the issue that one’s potential score depends on human
capital investment decisions previously made by parents and child, and for that reason is not immutable.
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free–standing tax–and–transfer program,
with the taxes or transfers calculated at
birth (if not earlier) and actual remittances
made throughout a person’s life.7 But other
approaches are possible. Instead, the results
of the genetic endowment test could simply
be used as an input in the determination of
an individual’s tax liability, for example,
as blindness, age and marital status are
used in the current U.S. income tax system.
Under such a system, genetic information
would be used as a “tag,” in the language
of Akerlof (1978). Akerlof showed that
any immutable characteristic of an individual that is correlated with ability can
improve the equity–efficiency tradeoff of
a tax system, because the use of such tags
can produce some degree of redistribution
without any efficiency cost (due to the
immutability of the characteristic), thus
reducing the need for distortionary redistributive tax instruments (which are not
based on immutable characteristics), such
as the graduated income tax.8
So why do we not already have a genetic
endowment tax? For one thing, we do not
presently have a test for overall genetic
endowment. Despite all of the recent
advances in genetic testing, scientists have
yet to isolate the aspects of a genetic profile
that measure an individual’s innate capacity to produce income or well–being. There
is, of course, a sense in which the existence
of such a gene or combination of genes is
problematic, even as a conceptual matter.
The correlation of a particular genetic characteristic (which is innate) with lifetime
income or lifetime well–being will depend
on a number of contingent, external factors. Thus, whether a specific genetic profile will lead to higher lifetime well–being
will depend on how the economy in which
the person lives values the particular
7

8
9

10

attribute associated with that profile. For
example, whether a gene or combination
of genes and epigenes for mathematical
proficiency, if there is such a thing, would
correlate with a relatively high lifetime
income will depend upon the value placed
on such a skill by the economy in which
that individual happens to live.
Notwithstanding that qualification, we
can still imagine science some day progressing to a point at which it is possible
to identify significant and stable statistical
correlations between a given genetic profile and lifetime earnings or even overall
well–being. At least, such a development
is not beyond our imagination. Indeed,
according to some reports, researchers
have in fact uncovered evidence of a gene
that appears at least to influence some
aspects of intelligence9 and have certainly
identified genes that affect one’s propensity to acquire debilitating diseases, both
of which would seem to be characteristics
that would be importantly relevant to
measuring lifetime well–being in any
likely future economy. Thus, in the spirit of
exploration and speculation that inspired
this conference on the future of taxation
and technology, our paper will explore
how genetic information might be used
in some future tax–and–transfer regime.
Not every conclusion or speculation in
this paper, however, is pure science fiction.
Some of the existing genetic research that
identifies links between particular genes or
collections of genes and numerous debilitating and sometimes deadly diseases
could also be used as part of an endowment
tax regime. Insofar as poor health suggests
lower overall well–being, an endowment
tax regime based on health–related genes
could be social–welfare enhancing.10 This
conclusion is strengthened by the fact that

Compare this to the proposal made in Ackerman and Alstott (1999) to grant a fixed sum of $80,000 to all people
when they reach the age of 21 and who have also finished their high school studies.
On this see Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Sanchirico (2001).
See Tang, Shimizu, Dube, Rampon, Kerchner, Zhuo, Liu, and Tsien (1999), Burdick, Lencz, Funke, Finn,
Szeszko, Kane, Kucherlapati, and Melhotra (2006), and Nesser, Boodoo, Bouchard, Boykin, Brody, Ceci, Halpern,
Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg, and Urbina (1996).
This requires that, other things equal, the social marginal utility of resources increases with declining health status.
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there is a strong correlation between health
and income. In this paper we sketch out
how such a genetic endowment tax might
be designed.
Even if a genetic endowment tax were to
become a practical possibility, there would
still be critics of such a policy. For some of
those critics, the taxation of human potential—as opposed to taxing the realization
of that potential as, say, income—is per se
wrong, because such a tax would in some
sense force individuals to work who prefer
not to work, to work more than they desire,
or to work in occupations that they otherwise would not choose. This is sometimes
called the problem of “talent slavery” or
“wage slavery.”11 For other commentators
the case for adopting an endowment tax is
problematic because, depending on one’s
assumptions about taxpayer utility functions, it is not clear that an endowment
tax will increase overall social welfare.12
Although we do believe (and argue below)
that some (though not all) of these criticisms
of endowment taxation have been overstated, we do not in this essay attempt to
offer a systematic defense of an endowment
tax. Indeed, we do not argue for or against
any particular change in policy. Rather, the
point of the essay is to describe what a particular type of endowment tax—what we
call a genetic endowment tax—might look
like in some not–too–distant future world,
and to begin an examination of its advantages and disadvantages. Thus, this paper is
meant not to advance any particular policy
change, but to kindle the imagination.
11
12
13

14
15

16

In that spirit, we highlight one rationale
for the adoption of an endowment tax that
has not been discussed in the economic or
philosophical literatures on the subject.
Even if one agrees with the fundamental
criticisms of the genetic endowment tax,
once the relevant genetic tests become
available, government policymakers will
inevitably face the question of how to
respond. This is because, even if the government does nothing, even if no genetic
endowment tax regime is adopted, private
employers (in deciding whom to hire and
on what terms) and private insurance
markets (in deciding whom to insure and
on what terms) can be expected, in the
absence of an effective legal prohibition,
to incorporate such genetic tests into their
hiring and underwriting practices. Such
market responses would tend to exacerbate existing inequalities of well–being
that flow from genetic differences.13
As we explain below, the government
might anticipate or react to these various
developments in a number of different
ways. One possibility, to which much
legal scholarship has attended,14 would
be a regulatory response; specifically, the
government could adopt laws limiting
the use of genetic information by insurers
and employers. In fact, such genetic anti–
discrimination rules have been adopted
in many states in the U.S.15 Also, federal
law restricts the use of genetic information
in certain situations by insurers seeking to exclude pre–existing conditions.16
In addition, President Clinton in 2000

See Rakowski (2000), Rawls (2001), Murphy and Nagel (2002), Zelenak (2006), and Hasen (2007).
See Shaviro (2000).
In addition, private genetic–testing companies will enter the market. Rugnetta, Russell, and Moreno (2008)
note that, for example, DNADirect, Inc. offers 17 condition–specific tests (such as for blood clotting or diabetes
risk) of varying cost directly to a private consumer.
See Rothenberg (1995), Reilly (1997), and Diver and Cohen (2001).
For example, 47 states currently have laws that restrict the use of genetic information by health insurance
companies. Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Washington appear to be the only exceptions. See the National
Human Genome Research Institute Policy (NGRIP) and Legislation Database at http://www.genome.gov/
PolicyEthics/LegDatabase/pubsearch.cfm. See also National Conference of State Legislatures tables on health
insurance (at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/genetics/ndishlth.htm).
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), enacted in 1996, prohibits health insurance companies, under certain circumstances, from excluding individuals from group health coverage on the
basis of pre–existing conditions. The law specifically states that genetic information alone cannot constitute
a pre–existing condition.
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issued an executive order (Executive
Order 13145) prohibiting federal agencies from obtaining genetic information
about their employees or job applicants
and from using genetic information in
hiring and promotion decisions. In May
2008, Congress overwhelmingly passed
(and President Bush promised to sign)
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, which prohibits health insurance
companies from using genetic information
to deny benefits or raise premiums for
individual policies, and sets large fines for
employers who use genetic information in
making decisions about hiring, firing, or
compensation. The bill does not address
discrimination by long–term care insurers
or life insurers.
Such rules, we argue, can be understood
as a form of indirect (somewhat hidden)
genetic endowment tax–and–transfer
regime. Alternatively, the government
could allow insurers and employers to
use genetic information to sort employees (that is, eliminate the existing genetic
antidiscrimination laws) and could then
implement a direct system of endowment
taxation and transfer based on genetic
information.
If, however, the government were to
choose a third path—to allow genetic
discrimination by repealing any existing
genetic antidiscrimination laws without
adopting an explicit genetic endowment
tax–and–transfer regime as a replacement—we explain how the market itself
might respond yet again, perhaps in the
form of what we call “endowment insurance,” which would be, in effect, a market–
provided form of endowment taxation.
Whichever of these paths is taken, our
general conclusion is that the increasing
17

18

availability of genetic information to tax
administrators, and the use of genetic
information by private employers and
insurers, will affect the optimal design of
a tax–and–transfer regime.17
A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF THE
ENDOWMENT TAX LITERATURE
From Optimal Income Taxes
to Endowment Taxes to Tagging
Tax theorists have long struggled with
the problem of designing a tax regime
that balances the competing concerns of
allocative efficiency and distributional
equity. It is well known that, assuming
the conditions of a competitive market,
the only truly efficient tax–one that does
not distort decisions—is a lump–sum
tax, which means a tax that does not vary
based on individual choices or behavior.
The most straightforward lump–sum tax,
the uniform lump–sum tax (or head tax)
under which everyone pays the same
amount, is universally considered distributively unacceptable. This conclusion
can be based on any of several normative
theories. For example, under a simple
utilitarian approach that assumes that all
individuals in society have identical cardinal utility functions that reflect a diminishing marginal utility of money, some
degree of redistribution from the rich to
the poor would be social–welfare maximizing. Indeed, if we ignore the incentive
effects of such transfers, a simple utilitarian framework would suggest a policy of
full equalization of wealth.18 Of course,
once we allow for the fact that taxes and
transfers do affect incentives, including
labor–market incentives, it becomes clear

One important issue raised by the use of genetic information that we do not address in this paper is the
concern about privacy. Some individuals may object to any use by the government or by private parties not
authorized by them of their genetic information as a fundamental violation of privacy or because of the fear
that it might be used in ways that are initially unintended or may end up being passed on to parties who are
not supposed to have it. Such concerns would have to be addressed systematically before any tax or transfer
system based on genetic information would be viable.
This was first pointed out by Edgeworth (1897).
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whose terms are distorted by, say, an
income or consumption tax. Similarly, the
endowment tax appeals to some liberal
egalitarian philosophers who argue that
inequality attributable to “brute luck”—
of which differences in innate earning
power would be an example—is morally
arbitrary and (putting aside the wage
slavery problem for the moment) ought
to be eliminated through redistributive
policy, whereas inequality attributable
to informed choices are “deserved” and,
hence, not appropriate targets for redistributive transfers.20
In this essay, we consider a relatively
modest application of the endowment tax
idea based on Akerlof’s (1978) observation
that, even in a system of distortionary
taxes, if the tax policymaker can identify
“tags”—observable characteristics of individuals that correlate with ability and that
are not a matter of choice—those tags can
be used to lower the welfare cost of any
distortionary tax regime. The particular
context in which Akerlof wrote was the
debate over how to deal with the problem
of poverty; specifically, whether to use a
negative income tax by itself or whether
instead to supplement a negative income
tax with adjustments or transfers based
on various tags such as age, blindness, or
disabled status. What Akerlof showed was
that the use of such tags can indeed lower
the cost of redistribution. Thus, any extent
of redistribution accomplished through
tagging rather than differentials in income
tax rates produces less overall distortion
of choices, such as labor supply decisions.
A tax system that includes tags, however, is only as good as the tags that are
chosen. A useful tag has three qualities: it
must be observable by the taxing authority, it must be immutable, and it must be
correlated with attainable well–being. The
absence of any one of these factors under-

that redistributive transfers come at a cost
that must be taken into account.
That is precisely what the optimal tax
literature does. It develops models of
optimal—i.e., social–welfare maximizing—tax regimes that take into account
both the social welfare benefits (due to
redistribution) and the social welfare
costs (due to distorting behavior away
from taxed activities) of those regimes.
Critically, almost all of this literature
assumes that an individual’s endowment,
or innate earning potential, cannot be
directly observed by the taxing authority.
Thus, Mirrlees’ path–breaking 1971 article
and nearly all that followed it focused
on the design of an optimal income tax,
on the theory that income, which is the
product of unobservable endowment and
unobservable effort, is in fact observable.
Scholars working in the optimal tax field,
including Mirrlees, however, have long
acknowledged that if earning potential
could somehow be observed, then any
redistributive tax regime could in theory
be made more efficient by switching to
a system of taxes and transfers based
directly on ability.19 The intuition behind
this conclusion is simple: for any tax
regime that redistributes on the basis
of income (or on the basis of any other
observable characteristic, such as wealth
or consumption, that is the product of
endowment and individual choices such
as labor effort), there would be an alternative endowment–tax regime that could
achieve the same level of redistribution at
lower cost in terms of distorted choices.
The appeal of an endowment tax,
therefore, is that in theory such a tax
can be calculated on the basis of an individual’s earning potential irrespective
of her choices or effort, thus eliminating
any distortion in the choices between
work and leisure or any other choice
19
20

An early treatment in the economics literature is Allingham (1975).
See Dworkin (1981a, 1981b).
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cream consumption were correlated
with income–earning ability, allowing
tax liability to depend on ice cream consumption would reduce the inefficiency
for any given amount of redistribution,
even though no one would argue that
it measures ability or a component of it.
Thus, although we will argue below that
genetic information may at some point in
the future measure expected ability to earn
(and enjoy) income, the tagging argument
does not require that genetic information
actually measure ability, but only that the
genetic index be correlated with ability.22

mines its usefulness as a tag. Indeed, a
highly imperfect tag will almost certainly
introduce more capriciousness into the
distribution of tax liability than is justified
by its efficiency benefits, and should not
be used. This is not to say, of course, that
all three of these factors must be perfect.
The tag, if not directly observable, must at
least be something that can be estimated
with minimal error. There will always be
the problem of individuals attempting to
falsify their tag status—people pretending to be disabled, for example—and
such fraud obviously inhibits the social
gains available from the use of tags. (Of
course, such fraud is a problem with any
tax base, including income or wealth,
and there is little reason a priori to expect
the problem to be more pronounced
with tags.) In addition, a tag need not be
totally immutable (even blindness can be
self–induced), but it must be relatively
so—relative, again, to the other options,
such as income. And finally, the correlation between the tag and attainable
well–being also need not be perfect. Just
good enough. Overall, the observability,
immutability, and attainable well–being
correlation need only be good enough that
the social welfare gains from basing taxes
and transfers on the tag exceed the welfare
losses.21 Besides the tags mentioned by
Akerlof—age, blindness, and disability
status—commentators have considered
height (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2007) or
even race (Logue, 2004).
Note that a useful tag need only be
correlated with the unobservable ability
to produce and enjoy well–being, and
it need not explicitly measure overall
ability or even a component of it. If ice
21

22

23

Criticisms of Endowment Taxation
(and Responses)
Some commentators in the legal and
philosophical literatures object on principle to an endowment tax. The idea
seems to be that, under an endowment
tax, high–ability people whose tastes
tend to leisure rather than goods would
be “forced” to work to pay their tax bills;
whereas, under an income tax, in contrast,
a high–ability person can choose not to
work and, thus, avoid paying any tax if
she so decides. Since every tax produces
some form of this income effect, however,
it is not clear why the particular income
effect associated with an endowment tax
would be especially problematic. That
is, whenever an income or consumption
tax is adopted (or the rates of an existing
income or consumption tax are raised), it
can be argued that people are “forced” to
work more than before the change to the
extent they want to maintain a given level
of consumption.23 Yet we do not generally
hear “wage–slavery” or “talent–slavery”

Stern (1982) formalizes the choice between a distortionary tax based on an easily observable indicator of ability
such as income and a tax based on an immutable tag that is, however, observed with error.
A gene–based tag seems less susceptible to the criticism made by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2007) that such a tax
is intuitively unappealing because it is not targeting the “true” source of inequality, as would be true of height
as a tag in a modern economy in which the non–tall are the object of discrimination but not in an economy
based on “tall fruit–bearing trees.”
Others have made this basic point. See Kaplow (1994), Shaviro (2000), and Stark (2005).
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otherwise identical individuals experience
unusually high disutility (or unusually
high utility) from working, it is less clear
that overall welfare could be improved by
a regime of endowment taxation.25 That is,
if we do not know that high–income people value the next dollar earned at least
somewhat less than low–income people,
the case for redistribution—at least under
a utilitarian framework—is thrown into
doubt. Of course, a similar objection can
be raised against the redistributive effects
of a progressive income or consumption
tax. This objection, therefore, seems more
appropriately directed at the idea of redistribution more generally.
Although many of the recent discussions of an endowment tax have focused
on extreme versions of the tax (such as
replacing the income tax with an endowment tax), which presumably helps to
explain the preoccupation with wage
slavery, we focus in this paper instead
on a more modest use of the endowment
tax. Specifically, we consider the use of
tags to increase the efficiency of an existing redistributive tax regime, such as a
progressive income tax. Of course, even
the use of this type of tag can be criticized.
One objection that is sometimes raised
is that, even if the tag satisfies the three

complaints in connection with those
changes.24
A more subtle, and potentially more
serious, critique of the endowment
tax comes from within the utilitarian
framework itself. This critique raises the
following question: can we be sure that
an endowment tax will increase overall
social welfare if we relax the traditional
assumption (sometimes implicit and
sometimes explicit in economic models of
the endowment tax) that taxpayers have
identical utility functions with respect to
work and leisure? Thus, when tax policy
commentators applying a utilitarian
framework argue in favor of some degree
of redistributive transfer from the better
off to the less well off, they often adopt the
assumption that all individuals have identical utility functions, at least with respect
to goods (income) versus leisure, and they
assume (as is standard) that those utility
functions are concave. The result is that
overall utility is maximized when income
(or, under an endowment tax, potential
income) is redistributed from rich to poor,
until the marginal utility of income is
equalized across the population. But the
analysis becomes much more complicated
and the result less certain when we relax
those assumptions. If, for example, some
24

25

In addition, the argument that an individual can avoid paying income tax simply by deciding not to work
at all, or can avoid paying consumption tax by not consuming, is misguided. Everyone has to produce some
income and engage in some consumption to survive; and when they do, the income or consumption tax will
be there to get them, just as the endowment tax would be. And it is not a response to this observation to
argue that an individual with a very small amount of income or with very low levels of consumption might
be exempted from an income tax or consumption tax (either through personal exemptions or exemptions for
expenditures on necessities, respectively). Such an exemption could just as easily be adopted as part of an
endowment tax regime. Likewise, it seems nonresponsive to argue that under an income or consumption tax,
but not under an endowment tax, an individual can avoid taxation by not engaging in market transactions
and by instead limiting her consumption to self–provided goods and services. This distinction too, however,
depends on what amounts to an exemption in the existing models of real world income and consumption
taxes for imputed income. A similar exemption could be made a part of an endowment tax, with all of the
associated benefits and costs of such a policy. Alternatively, as Kaplow (1994) has suggested, an endowment
tax that is capped at some percentage of an individual’s actual income would achieve some of the efficiency
benefits of the endowment tax while eliminating entirely the concerns of forced labor. Of course, how much
of the efficiency benefits of the endowment tax would be achieved would depend on the percentage used for
the cap and on the difference between individuals’ potential income and their actual income. See Zelenak
(2006).
This observation about endowment taxation has been made before, e.g., in Shaviro (2000). It is especially
problematic if the high–ability people on average have relatively high preferences for goods versus leisure.
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criteria discussed above—observability,
immutability, and correlation with attainable utility—redistribution with respect to
that tag can be stigmatizing. For example,
Mankiw and Weinzierl (2007) suggest
that, although height reliably correlates
with lifetime earnings (and, of course,
is observable and largely—although
not completely—immutable), the use of
height as a tag should be avoided because
it suggests that the tall are in some sense
more “able” than the short when, in fact,
a more likely explanation for the correlation with lifetime earnings is employment
discrimination against the non–tall. However, even if discrimination is the cause, it
is not clear why that conclusion would cut
against modest redistribution from tall to
short. It does suggest, however, that the
term “ability” may be misleading, in that
the term suggests different levels of innate
talent or skill rather than, more generically
(and less normatively), different levels of
potential expected lifetime earnings. What
this discussion suggests is that, in policy
and academic discussions of endowment
taxation and tagging, care should be taken
to use the term “ability” only where it is
clearly appropriate.
Perhaps the most serious objection to
introducing a system of tags into a taxand-transfer regime is the worry that the
three factors described above are not satisfied. And this is a serious objection indeed.
The remainder of this paper addresses the
possibility of a future world in which tax
policymakers, as well as private actors,
are able, through genetic technology, to
identify genetic markers that meet these
criteria.
26

THE GENETIC ENDOWMENT TA(X/G)
The Potential–Earnings and Potential–
Health Indices
Imagine that a series of genetic tests are
invented that enable scientists, with the
help of statisticians and economists, to
develop a reliable estimate of the statistical correlation between an individual’s
genome and her prospects for lifetime
earnings.26 Based on these genetic tests
policymakers can produce an “endowment index” reflecting the overall potential expected value of an individual’s
innate endowment to produce income.
To what extent that potential is translated
into income will depend on many factors, including the individual’s tastes for
leisure versus market consumption and
immediate versus postponed consumption.
To further refine the analysis, imagine
that the overall genetic endowment index
might be broken into two separate but
related indices for every individual. The
first index corresponds to an individual’s
lifetime earning potential, which we
assume to be an approximation of the
individual’s ability to produce income
over her lifetime. The second index
relates to the individual’s lifetime potential health status. A less favorable health
status reduces attainable utility for a
given income and, we assume, increases
the social marginal utility of income. As
we explain below, both indices could be
further broken down into sub–indices.
In addition, the potential–earnings and
health–status indices can be combined
to determine a single genetic index that

We recognize that the relationship between any observable characteristic of an organism and its genome (i.e.,
all of the hereditary information usually encoded in the DNA, including both the genes and the non–coding
sequences of the DNA) is characterized by great complexity involving interaction between many genes, gene
products and environmental signaling. This interaction may involve many, even thousands, of genes for any
common disease like cancer or heart disease, and will also be a function of both one’s personal natural history
and one’s present environmental setting, so that even in simplified cases, where genetic connections may be
traced, the genes will have different effects in different environments. There is no question that appropriately
using genetic information as a tag for potential lifetime earnings is exceedingly complex, but given the enormously fast pace of scientific progress in this area, it may be a viable option some day.
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genetic markers she has. All of these
sub–indices could then be combined to
arrive at a single potential–earnings index.
The potential–health–status index
would be similar in conception. Suppose
that genetic research progresses to the
point that scientists can identify the particular genes and other genetic material
that are linked to substantially increased
risk of certain serious diseases, conditions,
or disabilities that tend to produce some
combination of (a) loss of earning power,
(b) unusually high medical bills (higher
than some average level of medical
expense), and (c) substantial reductions
in the individual’s quality of life (in terms
of pain, general misery, and loss of ability
to enjoy previously enjoyed activities).
This index, too, could be defined with
reference to some average level of lifetime
health, which in turn would be based on
some average level of risk of contracting
various diseases.27
One function of such an index in a
genetic endowment tax–and–transfer
regime would be to enable further refinement of the estimate of an individual’s
lifetime potential earnings. After all, it
is easier for a healthy person to find and
keep a job than an unhealthy person. In
addition, individuals with below–average health, even if their employment
prospects are unaffected, may need
additional resources in the form of medical care merely to restore them to some
average baseline level of wellness or well–
being. (This fact, of course, is the point
of health insurance: to shift resources
from the healthy to the unhealthy state
of the world.) For these reasons, just as
lawmakers might reasonably decide that
social welfare would be increased by
making transfers from individuals with
high potential earnings to those with low

is assumed to be (again, as a result of
scientific progress) completely observable, utterly immutable (putting aside the
possibility of genetic engineering), and
closely correlated with potential utility.
Now consider how the potential–earnings index might further be broken down
into sub–indices that would correspond to
the components of innate earning potential. For example, imagine the day when
there is a genetic marker, ascertainable at
birth or earlier, for an individual’s ability
to do complex reasoning and mathematics, skills that may correspond with higher
lifetime earning power. Likewise, there
may some day be genetic markers for the
ability to work well with other people,
the ability to inspire loyalty among one’s
co–workers, the ability to persevere in
the face of adversity, and even the ability to discern profitable opportunities
from unprofitable ones or to distinguish
trustworthy partners from scoundrels.
And let us assume that all of these abilities turn out to be positively correlated
with lifetime earnings. In addition, there
may someday be genetic markers (such
as, apparently, the genetic profile associated with height) that correlate strongly
with potential earnings, but that are not
representative of differences in ability.
Rather, the differences may be attributable
to discrimination or something else that
remains undiscovered.
Each of these genetic sub–markers for
potential earnings could then be used
to produce a sub–index for each characteristic that, for the sake of argument,
we presume is normalized around some
societal average with respect to that characteristic. Thus, an individual might have
a positive, zero, or negative sub–index
for mathematical ability, perseverance,
height, and so on, depending on which
27

As with the potential–earnings index, the potential–health index could be further broken down into sub–indices
by disease or condition. Thus, an individual could have a positive, zero, or negative index for, say, cancer (or
lung cancer or a particular type of lung cancer, etc.) based on whether her likelihood of contracting cancer
during her lifetime was less than, equal to, or greater than some baseline level of risk. Separate sub–indices
for every major disease could be developed, which could then be combined to produce a single health index.
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potential earnings, they might reach a
similar conclusion about transfers from
those with better genetic potential for
good health to those with a worse genetic
health.
These two indices might then be
summed to produce one endowment
index, which might then be used in an
endowment tax regime to achieve some
level of non–distortionary redistribution. Transfers could be made from those
with a positive endowment index to
those with a negative endowment index.
Furthermore, we might assign graduated rates to both the health–related and
potential–earnings–related taxes and
transfers, depending on how far above
or below the baseline the particular index
falls, such that those with, for example, a
higher level of potential earnings would
pay a higher percentage of those earnings
in tax. Alternatively, going back to the
tags analysis from above, one might use
the endowment indices as adjustments to
the already existing income tax system.
This adjustment could be in the form of a
deduction or a credit, possibly refundable
as with the EITC. Again, the advantage
of either approach—the free–standing
endowment tax–and–transfer regime or
the endowment adjustment to the existing tax regime—is that it would allow us
to achieve a given distributional target
while reducing the level of progressivity
in the existing income tax system, thus
reducing overall tax–induced distortions
in the system.28
28

If for some reason policymakers preferred to have a redistributive regime that
took into account only some of the various
factors that affect lifetime potential earnings or lifetime health status, they could
leave out some of the various sub–indices
discussed above. The endowment index
could be designed to include or exclude
whatever combination of the various
sub–indices the policymakers thought
was appropriate. Thus, if policymakers
decided that differences in lifetime earnings associated with differences in height
or hair color or facial features should not
be reduced by redistributive transfers,
they could leave those factors out of the
index. The point of collapsing, or building,
all of the various genetic differences into
a single index is not to suggest that all
genetically affected differences in earnings
or health potential are the same. Obviously they are not. Rather, the point is that
insofar as a transfer of cash is to be used
as a redistributive tool for any given set
of genetic differences, it only makes sense
to reduce those differences to a single
metric for the purpose of calculating the
redistributive transfer.
Implementation Issues
For such an endowment tax–and–transfer regime to work, policymakers would
obviously need to overcome numerous,
possibly insurmountable, conceptual and
technological difficulties. Some genes
may have both welfare–enhancing and

The current deduction for extraordinary medical expenses and the deduction for large casualty losses can
be understood as just this sort of adjustment of unusually large consumption needs. The difference with the
genetic health index would, in theory, be that the adjustment would be based on an individual’s innate (genetic)
propensity to contract certain diseases, thus eliminating any distortionary (moral hazard) effects that might
accompany the current approach. The gene–based argument should not be thought of as a replacement for
the realization–based deduction, though, unless the genetic test can predict outcomes without error.
Louis Kaplow has suggested to us the comparison to Social Security Disability Insurance, a payroll–tax–
funded program that provides income to people unable to work because of a disability until their condition
improves, and which offers income payments if their condition does not improve. A person qualifies if,
among other conditions, they have a physical or mental condition that prevents them from engaging in any
“substantial gainful work,” and the condition is expected to last at least 12 months or result in death. Although
medical proof is needed to show their inability to work, eligibility is subject to manipulation by applicants.
In this case, use of genetic information can improve the accuracy of the disability determination and thereby
more effectively target the payments, with less manipulation.
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for these possibilities would exceed the
costs of doing so is an open question.
Even if an index of the sort we are
imagining were created, presumably science would continue to develop over time,
and more information would emerge on
the connections between various genes
and potential earnings or potential health.
Also, the “tractability” of the factors could
change. There could also be changes
in the relative market value of various
abilities or the costs of various illnesses.
Thus, as mentioned above, having the
good–at–math gene might be extremely
valuable during one historical period, and
then much less valuable in another. As a
result, periodic adjustments to individuals’ endowment indices and sub–indices
would have to be made by the taxing
authority if the accuracy of the indices
were to be kept up to date. In theory, this
could be handled in year–to–year adjustments to an individual’s tax liability, as
the overall index is recalculated for each
individual based on the most current
science available. Of course, some level
of inaccuracy in the indices would be
acceptable, a fact that suggests that constant updating may not be required. The
fact, however, that the genetic endowment
index, and, thus, the endowment tax,
could change from year to year could
be seen as a grounds for criticizing the
endowment tax idea, and for preferring
an income or consumption tax, which do
not require continual modifications based
on scientific progress.32

welfare–reducing attributes. For example,
a gene may reduce one’s risk of cancer but
increase one’s risk of some other illness.
Such effects would have to be netted out.
Similarly, if an individual had a genetic
marker for several expensive but nonfatal
diseases, but also had a gene for longevity,
that grim combination would also need to
be taken into account.29 It is also likely that
many of the various genes that correlate
with traits that we regard as distributively
significant, and, hence, the endowment
tax indices and sub–indices based on those
genes, are also correlated with each other.
Thus, for example, the genetic profile that
correlates positively with “good judgment,” if there were such a thing, might
also be be associated statistically with
“low risk of lung cancer.” Or maybe not.
But this sort of interactive effect would
have to be worked out.
As it turns out, there is in fact a strong
positive correlation between health status
and earnings and, thus, probably also with
earnings potential.30 This fact implies that
an endowment tax based on the potential
health index alone would also automatically capture some of the differences in
earning potential. Put differently, an
individual’s genetic health status by itself
might well be a useful tag. The correlation
between health and income, however, is
neither perfect nor universal. Some people
with good health genes will have low
earning power, and some with bad health
genes will be high earners.31 Whether the
benefits of fine–tuning the tags to adjust
29

30
31

32

The possibility of a longevity gene creates special complications. For example, imagine that, if an individual
has this gene, her life expectancy is five years longer than the average. Now, if we are implementing a genetic
endowment tax that is based on ability to earn as well as healthcare expenditures, should this person pay
an extra tax (because she will be around longer to make more money) or receive a transfer (since she will be
around longer and have greater consumption needs)?
See, for example, Smith (1999).
If, counterfactually, the correlation were to go the other way (if high earners tended to be less healthy), the two
indices would have to be netted against each other in some way, and the use of the health tag alone might be
problematic. One could even imagine a situation in which the optimal transfer would be from the (on average
rich) sick to the (on average poor) healthy, or in the opposite direction, depending on the relative magnitude
of the two indices.
Although the optimal income tax would change as new evidence became available, such as new information
about the elasticity of taxable income at various income levels or on the distribution of earning ability.
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available to private parties, not merely to
the individuals themselves (who might
or might not want to know what their
genetic future holds), but also to potential
employers and insurers. We can imagine
both employers and insurers putting this
information to use. For example, potential
employers would have an incentive to use
the various genetic predictors of ability
(such as those correlated with aptitude in
math and abstract reasoning, good judgment, perseverance, amiable personality,
and so on) to help them select the right
people for the right jobs. Likewise, if there
are industrial jobs that are best performed
by people with special resistance to certain
toxins, or jobs best held by people with
specialized aptitudes, genetic testing
may facilitate such efficient, social–welfare–enhancing job sorting. Indeed, with
personality and aptitude tests that some
employers already use, this type of job–
sorting already occurs, though perhaps
with less accuracy than would be the case
if the genetic markers could also be used.
Genetically informed job sorting, thus,
could well increase overall social welfare.
Not all private uses of genetic information,
however, would necessarily be considered
benign. Employers and insurers might
also want to use some genetic markers in
ways that society regards as illegitimate
reasons for distinguishing among people
in employment decisions, and the law
could prohibit the use of those markers—
just as the law already prohibits the use
of such criteria as race, gender, and age
in employment decisions.33 In addition,
employers, and especially health insurers, would be very interested in an individual’s potential health status, although
not every employer and insurer would
necessarily be equally interested in the
same combination of health–related genes.
For example, insurers who offer standard

It is important here to emphasize that
these genetic indices would, at best,
reflect estimates of potential future earnings and future health. That is just how
genes work. Although there are some
diseases that seem to be wholly caused
by a person’s genes (Huntington’s disease
being the most famous example), most of
the information that genes provide about
health (and presumably about future
earnings as well) would be estimates of
probabilities; and the actual future health
or earnings of an individual will depend
on a combination of genetic predisposition and factors that bear on how the
genome is “expressed,” which can include
choices that the individual makes as well
as pure brute luck. Thus, just as having
the lung–cancer gene (if one exists) would
probably only mean that a person has a
higher–than–average chance of getting
lung cancer, having the good–at–math
gene would only mean that a person has
a higher–than–average chance of turning
out to be a math whiz.
The Market Response to the Spread of
Genetic Information and the Potential
Government Counter Responses
Whether or not tax–and–transfer policy
reacts to the availability of genetic information, private markets almost certainly
will, unless the government steps in to
prevent it. In this section we discuss some
of the possible market responses, the
benefits and costs of regulation of private
use of this information, and whether these
market responses suggest a reassessment
of a gene–based tax–and–transfer system.
Imagine that the scientific advances
in identifying genes that determine or
influence potential earnings and potential
health status described above become a
reality and that such information becomes
33

For example, some may object to the use of a genetic test for potential aptitude in place of an actual aptitude
test. However, presumably an employer would use the combination of genetic and actual aptitude tests that
would produce the most accurate overall prediction of likely job performance.
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eases had access to that information and
insurance companies did not, health and
disability insurance markets might not
be sustainable (depending on how many
individuals had those genes.) Genetic
risk segregation can prevent this sort of
collapse of insurance pools due to genetically motivated adverse selection. More
generally, fine–tuned risk segregation in
insurance markets facilitates the pricing
of insurance according to individual risk
characteristics.
To the extent, however, that differences
in health risks are genetically determined
(and, thus, are outside of the control of
the individual), there is an obvious tension between the notion that individuals
should pay insurance premiums that are
actuarially fair (that reflect their expected
costs to the insurance company) and
society’s concern with distributive justice,
discussed above. That is, we mentioned
above the fact that lawmakers might
decide to increase social welfare through
transfers from those with better genetic
health prospects to those with worse
genetic health prospects, just as lawmakers might decide to make transfers from
high potential earners to low potential
earners. The point of both sorts of transfers is to equalize the social marginal
utility of income across individuals,
and thereby maximize overall utility
or welfare. When insurance companies
can charge premiums that reflect genetically determined risks, however, it cuts
in exactly the opposite direction. Rather
than transferring from the better off to
the less well off, genetically “accurate”
insurance premiums reproduce the status quo: those with better genes pay less,
while those with worse genes pay more.
Again, this is the result of competition
among insurers.

health insurance coverage would want
to know an individual’s genetic predisposition to various diseases that produce
significant lifetime medical expenses.
Indeed, such information would allow
them to charge extremely “accurate” (in
terms of actuarial accuracy) premiums
to very narrowly drawn risk pools. Of
course, for those individuals with a very
strong genetic predisposition to the most
expensive diseases, health insurance may
well become cost–prohibitive. In addition,
insofar as employers provide health insurance to their employees, or they serve as
the underwriters of self–insured health
benefit plans for their employees, as is
often currently the case, the two effects
would exacerbate each other: employers
would be inclined not to insure, or hire
at all, those with genetically predicted
poor health.34
The market process just described,
at least when it occurs in the insurance
context, is often referred to as risk segregation or risk classification. It is an
almost inevitable result of competition
among employers and insurers. And it
is normally considered to be efficiency
enhancing. Accurate risk segregation,
for example, helps insurance markets to
function by allowing insurers to combat
the problem of adverse selection due to
asymmetric information, the tendency
of relatively high–risk individuals to
select into insurance pools, driving up
the average cost of the pool and pricing
some people out of the market. Obviously, the problem of adverse selection
could become much worse in a world in
which individuals themselves have access
to their own genetic health profiles, but
insurers do not. Thus, if individuals who
might have a genetic predisposition to
certain debilitating and expensive dis34

Life insurance markets would also be affected. Life insurance companies would use the health–status sub–
indices relating to longevity to determine how much to charge for life insurance premiums, and individuals
with genetic markers for high risk of cancer and heart disease would either be forced to pay very high life
insurance premiums or go uninsured.

856

Genes as Tags: The Tax Implications of Widely Available Genetic Information
fairness concerns with redistributing
only from the genetically lucky to the
genetically unlucky within an insurance
pool that does not include everyone in
society. That is, if the tax–and–transfer
system were used to equalize between
the genetically healthy and genetically
unhealthy, the redistribution could be
from everyone in society with the good
genes to everyone in society with the
bad genes. In general, spreading the
redistribution over a larger base reduces
the overall welfare cost of the redistributive regime. By contrast, if the regulatory approach is used—causing indirect
transfers within insurance pools due to
the rule against genetic discrimination—
redistribution is more haphazard; it will
be more effective for people in large pools
than for those in small pools. Second, if
insurers are forbidden to use genetic
information but insurance applicants
can use it, the potential for adverse selection is obvious. Third, if insurers cannot
use genetic information, moral hazard
problems arise as well. For example,
if there were a gene that revealed only
a predisposition to a certain disease
(say, heart disease or cancer), insurers
might be able to use that information to
encourage those who are insured to take
special steps to reduce their risks, such
as through diet or exercise.36 Forbidding
the use of that information could actually
impede appropriate medical treatment
in that case.
All of these factors suggest that, if
the government is going to adopt a
redistributive response to the spread of
genetic information, the best approach
might be to allow insurers and employers to use genetic information, but then
adopt an explicit genetic endowment
tax regime (via tagging) that reduces the
inequality between the genetic haves

Given this world of insurers competing to price their policies to maximize
profits and of employers seeking to place
employees in the jobs that maximize the
employers’ profits, and assuming for
now that society (again, on welfarist or
utilitarian grounds) wishes to reduce
some of the inequality between the genetically rich and genetically poor, there are
at least two obvious policy responses to
the spread of genetic information. First,
we could allow genetic risk segregation
and job sorting to take place and then
redistribute through a direct tax–and–
transfer policy, as outlined in the previous section, perhaps through a tagging
system added to an existing income tax
regime; this would achieve the efficiency
gains in insurance and labor markets
without any unwanted distributional
consequences. Alternatively, we could
forgo the tagging approach and instead
adopt insurance and employment laws
forbidding genetic discrimination—that
is, forbidding the use of genetic information in employment and insurance
contexts.
At first blush, forbidding the use of
genetic information by insurers would
seem to have much the same effect as
allowing them to use the genetic information but then enacting a redistributive
tax–and–transfer system to undo the
effect of the insurance discrimination.
What’s more, the anti–discrimination
approach has the benefit of automatically calculating the welfare equalizing
amount of transfer that occurs within
the insurance pool; that is, the transfer
(or cross–subsidization) from low–risk to
high–risk individuals will exactly offset
the genetically determined difference in
pre–insurance well–being.35 This type of
indirect transfer regime, however, has
some problems. First, there may be some
35
36

This conclusion assumes that the insurance fully covers the risk that is insured.
Note that the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 does allow insurance companies to urge
patients to take appropriate genetic tests so as to help find the best, cost–effective therapy.
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and have–nots.37 Interestingly, the law
in the U.S. seems to have gone the other
way. As we have already noted, there is
no explicit genetic endowment tax–and–
transfer regime currently in the U.S., while
most state governments in the U.S. have
adopted rules forbidding insurers from
using genetic testing in their underwriting procedures, and some have done the
same with employment practices.38 What
is interesting for present purposes is the
following observation: insofar as we
have laws forbidding the use of genetic
information, there is a sense in which we
already have policy that in some ways mimics
a form of genetic endowment tax, though an
imperfect one (and perhaps not even the best
one we could have).
This fact should, in our view, lead to a
reframing of the debate over the endowment tax idea. That is, given the reality
of the marketplace, and given the state
anti–discrimination laws that have been
adopted in response to the spread of
genetic information, we already have
policy akin to a form of endowment tax
regime, one that is administered indirectly
through employment and insurance markets. Thus, those who object to the “forced
labor” or “wage slavery” associated with
a direct endowment tax should also be
concerned with the forced–labor effect of
an indirect endowment tax. Thus, when an
insurer, due to a state law against genetic
discrimination, is forced to charge a genetically healthy individual a higher premium than she would have been charged
if the insurer had been allowed to charge
lower, actuarially fair (and genetically discriminatory) premiums, there would be
a sort of “income effect.” The individual
with the “healthy” genetic makeup would
have to work harder or longer hours at
37

38

her job, or might even have to switch to
a higher–paying job, to achieve the same
level of consumption that she would
under an actuarially fair insurance regime.
As with the direct endowment tax, there
would be no distortion in her choices, no
substitution effect, as the “tax” (that is,
the difference between her actual insurance premium and the actuarially fair
insurance premium) is lump–sum based
on the individual’s genetic profile. But
there could certainly be an income effect,
of the sort that has raised concerns among
endowment tax critics.
Thus, at this point, the relevant question
is not whether to adopt an endowment
tax regime, but whether to alter the one
we effectively already have (by making genetic discrimination fully legal in
all contexts). What the next subsection
points out is that, even if policymakers chose to alter the existing indirect
genetic endowment regime (that is, to
repeal all of the laws forbidding the use
of genetic information in insurance and
employment markets), the market may
yet respond again—this time with its own
form of an endowment tax–and–transfer system, which we call endowment
insurance.
Genetic Endowment Insurance
Let us for now assume that policymakers do decide to repeal the existing implicit
genetic endowment transfer regime (by
repealing laws against genetic discrimination) and decide also not to pursue
an explicit genetic endowment tagging
regime of the sort described above. What
this means is that employers and insurers
are allowed to require genetic testing of
their applicants, and are allowed to use

Note, however that there is less of a case for using an anti–discrimination principle instead of a genetic endowment tax if (a) there is universal compulsory health insurance (eliminating the adverse selection problem and
the concern about unfairly burdening a small pool of contributors) and (b) the anti–discrimination principle
is applied only to diseases or conditions that are fully genetically determined (such as Huntington’s disease)
where there is no, or relatively little, moral hazard concern (see Logue and Avraham (2003)).
See sources cited above in footnote 15, and also Rothstein (2001).
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care about the child and want him or
her to have a good life, or at least not to
have to bear the burden of a low genetic
endowment, and because they know that
their own prospects are tied to those of the
child, since the child’s consumption and
medical needs will be their responsibility
(at least for 18 years or so) and since they
may be hoping the child will become rich
and support them in their old age. So this
genetic score means a lot to them.
Enter the genetic endowment insurer,
which offers to sell the couple a policy that
covers the family against the risk that the
child will end up with a below–average
genetic endowment. The policy is written
and sold before conception, with a premium based presumably on the parent’s
own genetic endowment indices. After
conception, when the fetus’s genes can
be tested, the test is given, and the policy
either pays off or it does not. If the child
is found to have a low genetic endowment, the family receives a lump–sum
payment, which the parents can then
invest in a deferred annuity on behalf of
the child, the proceeds of which can be
used to fund the extra medical expenses
or to make up for loss of lifetime earnings
due to the child’s genetic endowment.
Thus, a transfer is made to the families of
the genetically unlucky children and, in
a sense (because only the unlucky ones
receive the insurance payout, though all
pay into the pool), a tax is imposed on the
families of the genetically lucky children.
Of course, if policymakers are concerned
that the parents of the genetically lucky
children will squander the insurance

the information as they see fit. Assume
also, of course, that individuals can have
themselves tested and learn their own
genetic makeup. One significant result of
this set of assumptions that has significant
consequences is that, at the moment an
individual is born—indeed earlier, at the
moment of conception (or the moment
when sperm and egg combine to create
a new set of chromosomes with its own
complement of genetic material and that
material can be analyzed without harm
to the fetus) or upon genetic testing of
the parents—much can be learned about
that individual’s future prospects. Indeed,
assuming technological advances have
given us the genetic endowment indices
described above, we can know whether
the individual is, overall, in terms of her
inherited genetic endowment, rich, poor,
or average.
In the absence of a genetic endowment
tax regime, what might we expect to happen? One possibility is the rise of a private
market in genetic endowment insurance.39
One way to see this point is from the
perspective of a risk–averse couple that
is thinking about having a child. They
know their own genetic endowments
and, thus, have the ability to estimate the
probability distribution of possible genetic
endowments for their child. But they cannot be sure of exactly what genetic draw
their child will receive. Putting aside for
now the prospect of genetic engineering, there is some irreducible degree of
uncertainty as to what their child’s mix
of genetic material will be. This concerns
the prospective parents both because they
39

Another possible repercussion is the rise of genetic engineering or eugenics, the incentive for which will depend on the genetic regulatory and tax–and–transfer policies in place, and any behavioral response to which
belies our labeling such policies as having no effect on behavior other than an income effect. It is also possible,
of course, that in some future world, technology may enable prospective parents to choose the DNA of their
children or at least to have some level of control or choice in the matter. To the extent that were to happen,
genetic markers, even if statistically correlated with well–being, would no longer be ideal tax tags, as they
would no longer be immutable from an ex ante perspective. A discussion of the ramifications of this, and
other related issues such as selective abortion, for our argument is best left for another time, beyond noting
that using a genetic tag in the tax–and–transfer system will reduce the incentive to undertake these gene–improving activities and on average reduces the long–term average genetic endowment in the same way that
an income tax affects income–producing activities.
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To the extent the government gets
involved in the problem of genetic
inequality—and either adopts an explicit
form of genetic endowment adjustment to
the income tax or (through, for example,
antidiscrimination rules) adopts regulatory policies that reproduce many of the
effects of a form of genetic endowment
tax—the demand for, and, thus, the market for, genetic endowment insurance
would disappear. What this observation
suggests is that privately provided genetic
endowment or a system–of–government–
provided genetic endowment taxes and
transfers are substitutes for each other.
This should come as no surprise. It has
often been observed that the existing
tax–and–transfer regimes are akin to
insurance for the as–yet unborn against
the possibility that they will be born with
a low endowment.42
Note that both government–provided
and privately provided genetic endowment insurance covers only the risk of an
unfavorable genetic draw, and does not
provide insurance against other types
of risk. For example, even if there were
a genetic endowment tax–and–transfer
regime or alternatively if there were a private market in genetic endowment insurance, neither form of protection would
address the risk that the economy might
change over time to render an individual’s
initial endowment less valuable or the risk

money, they could adopt a rule requiring
that the insurance proceeds be invested
and spent a certain way, but this idea
again takes us down the road of government intervention. The more government
involvement there is, the more restriction
there is on how the money is spent and
perhaps on the amount of premiums
that can be collected, the more a world of
privately provided genetic endowment
insurance begins to look like a regime of
direct genetic endowment taxation of the
sort described above, but administered
through private insurers as tax collectors.40
The idea of genetic endowment insurance may seem farfetched, but it is less
outlandish than one might think. Whenever a parent purchases life insurance on
their young child, they are effectively purchasing genetic endowment insurance of
sorts. That is, they are effectively purchasing insurance against the possibility that
the child will someday reveal a genetic
predisposition to an illness that will make
him uninsurable. This is explicitly how
the insurance is marketed.41 It is only a
few steps from this relatively common
form of insurance to a broader market
for insurance against bad health or ability
genes. What is interesting about the idea
for present purposes is that such genetic
endowment insurance would, if feasible, constitute a privately provided, wholly voluntary
system of endowment taxation and transfer.
40

41

42

This discussion highlights one interesting aspect of the rise of genetic endowment indices that we have not
yet discussed, and that is absent from the literatures on endowment taxation and genetic discrimination: each
time there is a new discovery linking a particular gene to a particular disease, that discovery has the qualities
of a one–time lump–sum wealth tax on all individuals who have that gene, whether born or unborn. That is,
if you are alive at the time the discovery is made, then, in the absence of a system of redistribution or cross
subsidization, you are essentially subject to a lump–sum tax equal to the present value of the lifetime expected
costs of having that gene. (And if you have any plans to produce children, the tax must be multiplied by
some inheritance factor.) This conclusion, however, assumes the absence of a market in genetic endowment
insurance.
For example, see www.afadvantage.com, where the pitch for such insurance is “No matter what health problems may develop in years to come, the policy cannot be cancelled.”
Sinn (2003) makes such an argument, stressing the possibility that cross–country mobility of individuals and
capital will erode the ability of countries to provide such insurance. Compare the classic argument of Harsanyi
(1955), who develops an approach to optimal progressivity based on risk–averse individuals choosing the
tax–and–transfer system in an “orignal position” where no individual has any information about what ability
they will draw from a known distribution.
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that the individual might come down with
some debilitating disease, whatever her
genetic predisposition for such a disease
might be. To put the point differently, how
an individual’s life turns out, in terms of
overall well–being (including income,
health, etc.), is a function both of her
initial genetic endowment and post–birth
brute luck, as well as many other factors;
genetic endowment insurance—whether
government– or privately provided—only
addresses the first.43 Of course, other types
of government transfer programs, as
well as other types of private insurance
policies, might serve as insurance against
these other sorts of risk. For example, the
progressive income tax and privately purchased insurance contracts provide coverage against the possibility of extreme ex
post outcomes. Such conventional forms
of insurance, however, raise all of the
familiar moral hazard problems associated
with standard forms of insurance; further
discussion of such insurance is beyond the
scope of this particular essay.

Thus, our first contribution to the
endowment tax literature is the observation that the spread of genetic information
bears on optimal tax design, to the extent
that genetic information is observable
and provides nearly immutable tags for
overall well–being. Our second contribution is to point out that, as genetic information spreads to private employers and
insurers (and assuming that, in contrast
to the current situation, the law did not
effectively prevent them from using such
information), the case for adopting some
kind of a genetic endowment tax becomes
more compelling, as genetic inequalities
would be exacerbated by market forces. If
society desires to reduce or eliminate such
inequalities, to maximize overall utility by
shifting resources from the genetic rich
to the genetic poor, at least two potential
policy instruments are available: a direct
genetic endowment tax–and–transfer
regime or a regulatory regime that forbids
genetic discrimination and forces genetic
cross–subsidization.

CONCLUSION
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